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ABSTRACT

We describe trends in wages and labor force participation for the “working class”—whom we
define as workers with high school or less education—compared to those with college or more.
We compare cyclical peaks over the entire period 1979–2019, with particular focus on the Great
Recession (2007–2010) and recovery (2010–2019). We also present results by gender and race.
We find real wage growth in the latter period for all workers, but not enough to change the longterm trends of growing inequality and stagnant wages for the less-educated; and we also find that
labor force participation continued to decline for the less-educated, even during the recovery.
Gaps between whites and blacks also grew, while Hispanics and Asians made more progress. We
consider various explanations of these findings and show that the early effects of the 2020‒2021
pandemic recession hurt less-educated workers and those of color more than anyone else.
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I.

INTRODUCTION
It is no longer news that most U.S. workers, especially those without college degrees, saw

wages stagnate over the past four decades; that inequality rose dramatically in this period; and
that millions of prime-age workers left the labor market (Groshen and Holzer 2019). Equally true
is that during the past dozen years, the U.S. labor market experienced unusually wide swings in
labor market conditions, which also affected workers’ outcomes. As we now experience the
ongoing COVID-19 recession in 2020–2021, this paper assesses how those two powerful
influences (the long-run trends and the recent business cycles) interacted in the U.S. labor
market, with particular focus on the continuing disappointing trends for noncollege workers.
On the one hand, the Great Recession of 2007–2010 was a cataclysmic event for U.S.
workers, generating the worst declines in employment observed in the nearly 80 years since the
Great Depression. 1 The recession was not only deep, but recovery from it also occurred quite
slowly. 2 On the other hand, the recovery lasted the longest of any on record, ultimately resulting
in the lowest U.S. unemployment rates since the late 1960s. Indeed, by February 2020, we had
had nearly five years of unemployment rates at or below 5 percent, which is also the longest such
period since the 1960s. Then, starting in March and especially in April 2020, the labor market
deteriorated very rapidly because of the Covid-19 recession. It recovered partially in the late
spring and early summer, but the recovery then slowed and eventually flatlined after October.

1
The Great Recession began in late 2007 but worsened substantially in 2008–2009. The economy began its
recovery in mid-2009 but not in the labor market until early 2010, since employment changes lag behind those in
output.
2
Unemployment peaked at about 10 percent in early 2010 and remained at or above 8 percent well into
2012.
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These labor market oscillations likely generated some lasting outcomes for workers, both
negative and positive. The Great Recession, which was both severe and long-lasting, had
detrimental effects on workers that may have continued long into the recovery. Economists refer
to these long-lasting effects of temporary recessions as hysteresis, as some workers are scarred
by lengthy spells without work, reducing their attractiveness to employers and/or their skills and
labor market contacts. On the other hand, a relatively tight labor market that lasts for many years
can support higher wage growth and career opportunities, perhaps with differentially large
impacts on less-educated workers.
Economists still debate the extent to which the labor market tightened during the
recovery. Various forms of “hidden unemployment” persisted and wage growth was modest
throughout most of it. Yet both the length and depth of the recovery clearly brought many
workers back into the labor force who had left, and enabled many to enjoy several years of
positive real wage growth. But after these years of progress, the pandemic recession of 2020
again imposed great employment losses on less-educated workers and those of color.
In this paper, we examine wage and employment outcomes for prime-age U.S. workers—
i.e., aged 25–54—over the period 1979–2019, with particular emphasis on the later years. Primeage workers are the ones whom it is most sensible to analyze, since they have mostly completed
their schooling but have not yet begun to retire. The years 2000–2007 and 2007–2019 constituted
two full business cycles, with cyclical peaks in 2000 and 2007, a Great Recession trough in
2010, and another peak in 2019. We therefore present a range of employment outcomes for the
years 1979, 2000, 2007, 2010, and 2019—but with a particular focus on the Great Recession and
its recovery between 2007 and 2019. We also contrast outcomes for workers with bachelor’s
degrees or above with outcomes for workers who, at most, finished high school (these constitute
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the “working class” in many analyses, including ours), with outcomes also broken down by
gender and race. 3
After presenting these results, we discuss the long-run market and institutional forces
behind the most disturbing trends in the labor market. We consider the extent to which the Great
Recession and subsequent recovery interacted with these forces to generate longer-term
improvement in some outcomes and further deterioration in others.
With this context in mind, we then turn to the effects of the Covid-19 pandemic and
associated recession on worker outcomes, and the extent to which less-educated workers and
those of color suffered the worst employment losses through the end of 2020. Though we do not
yet know the full extent to which these workers will suffer long-term employment losses, the
data we have to date are worrisome. We conclude by summarizing our findings and considering
implications for future trends and policy.

II.

TRENDS IN EMPLOYMENT AND EARNINGS, 1979–2019
We now consider trends in three major employment outcomes for U.S. workers: 1)

employment, 2) overall real wages, and 3) labor force participation. We will consider some
outcomes over the entire 40-year period between 1979 and 2019, but with a particular focus on
the years since 2007. We also consider outcomes for all workers, but with some particular
attention to those with high school or less education—whom we consider to be the U.S. working
class—and how their outcomes differ from those of college graduates.

3

Workers with some college but no degree are excluded when comparing outcomes for college and high
school graduates.
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Figures 1, 2, and 3 present the aggregate trends since 1979 in employment-to-population
ratios, labor force participation, and median real hourly wages, respectively, for the population
aged 25–54. We adjust wages for inflation using the chain-weighted GDP deflator for personal
consumption expenditures. 4 The wage measures exclude other forms of compensation, like
employer 401K contributions and the value of employer-provided health care; they also exclude
other transfer payments from government.
The employment-to-population ratio (Figure 1) follows the well-known peaks and
troughs in business cycles over the past 40 years, especially during the Great Recession and
afterward. Overall employment rates rose until 2000 but declined a bit during the years
afterward. By 2019, employment had recovered to its prerecession level in 2007, though not to
its earlier peak in 2000. This (and our other aggregate findings below) are consistent with
Shambaugh and Strain (2021).
Trends in labor force participation (Figure 2) and real wages (Figure 3) are somewhat less
cyclical. Participation among prime-age workers rose until 2000 and declined somewhat
thereafter; it declined overall during the Great Recession but had almost recovered to its 2007
level by 2019.
We also note that median real wages rose by only about 18 percent over the entire 40year period, with notable increases occurring only in the late 1990s to early 2000s and 2014–
2019. Indeed, during the latter five-year period, median real wages rose about 8 percent
overall—a welcome development, though not enough to change the overall view of relative wage
stagnation over four decades.

Real wages decline a bit more rapidly over time if one deflates nominal wages with the Consumer Price
Index for Urban Workers research series—CPI-U-RS—since the research series adjusts for some but not all of the
overstatement of annual inflation in the traditional CPI. See Moulton (2018) for a comparison of GDP and CPI
deflators over time. Wage figures throughout the paper appear in 2019 dollars.
4
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These broad aggregate trends in employment, participation, and real wages mask
considerable variation by education and gender over time. Figures 4 and 5 display trends in
median real wages separately for men and women, and for those with high school or less
education (Figure 4) and those with college (bachelor’s) degrees (Figure 5). We do the same for
labor force participation rates in Figures 6 and 7.
We present both sets of outcomes at five points in time: business cycle peaks in 1979,
2000, and 2007, the trough of the Great Recession in 2010, and the most recent cyclical peak in
2019. These comparisons enable us to infer just how much employment outcomes had
deteriorated by 2010, and the extent to which they recovered in the subsequent nine-year
expansion, particularly for noncollege workers.
Figures 4 and 5 illustrate the following outcomes for U.S. workers’ median real wages:
● Over the past 40 years, but especially during the years 1979–2000, real wages grew
rapidly for those with bachelor’s degrees but were flat or declining for those
without—that is, the “working class”—with better growth among women than men in
both cases.
● During the recovery from the Great Recession, median real wages increased for all
workers, with increases of roughly similar magnitudes.
Therefore, as seen in Figures 4 and 5, earnings inequality has risen substantially in the past 40
years by education within gender groups, but it has declined between gender groups.
We also know from published summary data that nominal wage growth (i.e., without
adjusting for inflation) remained somewhat modest after the Great Recession compared to earlier
periods of time; indeed, such increases barely ever rose much above 3 percent. But inflation has
also remained unusually low throughout this period despite the recovery from the Great
Recession, thereby translating modest nominal wage gains into more significant real wage
increases. It is also notable (as seen in Figure 3) that early wage gains in the period 2014–2019
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were needed to offset a bit of wage loss in the first few years of recovery (beginning in 2010),
before overall real wage growth could be observed.
Still, the length of this expansion allowed such increases to accumulate over time and
result in significant wage growth. And, as labor markets have been at least somewhat tight for a
lengthy period, the relatively greater sensitivity of disadvantaged workers to the business cycle
(Aaronson et al. 2019) has translated into mildly greater wage increases for them. Minimum
wage increases at the state and local levels no doubt added to real wage growth among the
lowest-wage workers. 5 Still, the observed wage increases in the recovery do not greatly change
the overall pattern of inequality growth across education groups over the past 40 years.
Figures 6 and 7 illustrate the following trends in labor force participation:
● It has declined the most over the past four decades for non-college-educated men,
while it rose rapidly for both less-educated and more-educated women from 1979 to
2000.
● It declined somewhat for most workers from 2000 to 2007, and then again in the
Great Recession.
● Participation in the labor force had fully recovered for college-educated women by
2019, but not for the working class or for men. 6
It is concerning that labor force participation has mostly leveled off for women overall since
2000, leaving their participation rates about 10 percentage points lower than those of men among
people with bachelor’s degrees (Figure 7). Women with only a high school education have
participation rates about 20 percentage points lower than comparable men (Figure 6).
When viewing trends over time by education, it is important to note that the composition
of these groups has been changing for two major reasons: 1) college enrollment and completion

5
6

https://www.ncsl.org/research/labor-and-employment/state-minimum-wage-chart.aspx.
Again, focusing on the years only since 2014 would no doubt show greater increases.
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rates have risen substantially over this 40-year period, and 2) immigrants constitute larger
fractions of men with high school or less education than before.
All else being equal, these two compositional changes would depress observed real wage
growth among less-educated men. The shift toward college enrollment would also tend to reduce
labor force participation, though the greater presence of immigrants would raise it (since
immigrant men have very high rates of labor force participation). Furthermore, the tendency of
less-educated men to withdraw from the labor force tends to truncate the lower end of the wage
distribution for men and raise their observed hourly wage rate. The net effect of all of these
compositional changes on observed wages and participation is therefore unclear, and the changes
do not clearly bias results in the downward direction for less-educated men.
Importantly, though participation for women rose consistently in the 1980s and 1990s
(and earlier), it has been uneven since then. Despite their recovery from the Great Recession, the
trend toward higher participation of American women in the late twentieth century remains
stalled in the twenty-first century.
Besides the effects documented above on men and women by education, what have
similar trends looked like by race? In Tables 1 and 2, we present median real wage (Figure 1)
and labor force participation trends (Figure 2) by race and gender. We present some data for five
racial groups—1) non-Hispanic whites, 2) blacks, 3) Hispanics, 4) Asians, and 5) Pacific
Islander/American Indians. Since not all of these groups were identified in CPS data all the way
back to 1979, we present data for those years in which they are available. Accordingly, we
present data for whites and blacks starting in 1979, for Hispanics and Asians starting in 2000,
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and for Pacific Islanders/American Indians (for whom we have separate data only in
participation rates, not in wages) starting in 2007. 7
The results of Table 1 indicate the following:
•

Real wages have risen strongly since 2000 for Asians (by about a third), Hispanics
(by 20–25 percent), and white females (by nearly half since 1979 and by about 20
percent since 2000).

•

Real wages also rose somewhat more modestly for black females (by about a third
since 1979 and about 12 percent since 2000).

•

Real wage growth has been quite modest for white males and almost nonexistent for
black males over the past 40 years.

•

All groups experienced some wage growth after 2010, especially Hispanics and
Asians.

The results of Table 2 on labor force participation indicate these trends:
•

Fairly constant participation among Asians, Pacific Islanders/American Indians, and
Hispanics over time, with mostly modest increases for women and decreases among
men for the latter two ethnic groups.

•

Large declines in participation among white and especially black men since 1979.

•

Large increases in participation among white and black females before 2000 but fairly
flat since then.

•

Modestly increasing participation (1 or 2 percentage points) for most groups of
women but mixed results for men during the recovery from the recession in 2010–
2019.

Overall, the results by race show impressive gains in wages and/or work activity for
Asians, Hispanics, and white women, disturbing declines in work for white and black men, and
rising gaps between whites and blacks overall. Our results are also broadly consistent with Biu,
Famighetti and Hamilton (2021) on blacks, Orrenius and Zavodny (2021) on Hispanics, and

Separate data for Hispanics and Asians in the CPS only became available during the 1990s; for American
Indians and Pacific Islanders they became available in 2003. In data before that time, the latter groups are merged
with Asians but do not materially affect results for Asians. Even today, American Indians and Pacific Islanders
constitute just 1 percent of the U.S. population, while Asians represent over 6 percent.
7

8

Akee (2021) on Pacific Islanders and American Indians). If anything, the declining labor force
activity we observe among black men is underrepresented in the civilian labor-force data due to
the underrepresentation of particular subgroups. 8
Finally, Figures 8 and 9 summarize the observed trends in real wages and labor force
participation for our education-by-gender and race-by-gender groups over the full business cycle
generated by the Great Recession and the recovery afterward, 2007–2019. Figure 8 focuses on
education and gender groups, while Figure 9 focuses on race and gender. The results again show,
for the entire cycle, major earnings gains for white women, Hispanics, and Asians; modestly
improving labor force participation for most racial groups of women but not for those with high
school or less education; and modest wage gains plus flat or declining participation for white and
black men, especially for the less-educated.
In sum, the Great Recession and our recovery from it did not greatly change longer-term
patterns of rising inequality between the working class and college-educated workers in the
United States, either in real wages or in labor force activity.

III.

WHAT EXPLAINS THESE TRENDS IN LABOR MARKET OUTCOMES?
What accounts for the overall trends in earnings and labor force participation that we

have documented, and also for different trends by gender and education, over the past four
decades, and more specifically during the period 2007‒2019? We first consider the secular and

8

Low-income black men, and especially those previously incarcerated, are undercounted in the census and
other surveys (Pettit 2012). These groups have very low labor-force participation rates, so their absence in the data
leads participation rates of less-educated men to be understated. Casual or informal work among such men likely
offsets these trends, but only partially. See also Kahn-Lang (2019).
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cyclical trends in earnings, which might partly drive the labor force participation trends. We
discuss these trends second.
A.

Earnings Trends: Markets, Institutions, and Business Cycles
In a purely statistical sense, three factors appear to drive the stagnation of aggregate

wages over the past 40 years: 1) declining productivity growth, 2) a decline in labor’s share of
productivity and income, and 3) a growing share of labor compensation accounted for by
nonpecuniary benefits like health care. But explaining why each of these three trends has
occurred is somewhat more challenging.
With the exception of the tech boom years (mid-1990s to mid-2000s), U.S. productivity
growth has been sluggish (Baily 2015). And though there has been some decoupling of worker
compensation from productivity during this period, a strong correlation remains (Stansbury and
Summers 2018). Possible culprits for sluggish productivity growth include the aging workforce
(Ozimek, DeAntonio, and Zandi 2017), too little investment in research and development
(Gruber and Johnson 2019), declining labor market fluidity (Molloy et al. 2016) and “secular
stagnation” (Rachel and Summers 2019).
Shifting distributions of productivity and income toward capital might be attributable to
rising automation (Acemoglu and Restrepo 2018), but they also could reflect the growing power
of employers in both product and labor markets. While technology, globalization, and
deregulation in the 1980s and 1990s were seen as forces enhancing product market competition,
rising product market concentrations since then may have offset those effects (Philippon 2019),
though the evidence on this point remains a bit mixed (Autor et al. 2017; Basu 2019).
Whether or not the monopsony power of employers has risen also remains unclear,
though it seems to have risen in some industries like health care (Prager and Schmitt 2021).
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Rising employer practices such as noncompete and nondisclosure agreements might also
contribute to monopsony in some industries (Krueger and Posner 2018; Nunn and Hunt 2021).
Finally, the growing share of worker compensation accounted for by health care no doubt
reduces pecuniary worker compensation. While the increases in these shares over time are not
much higher in recent decades than before (Burtless and Milusheva 2012), they clearly reinforce
the other determinants of lower compensation growth described above.
Whatever explains the overall stagnation in worker earnings, rising earnings inequality in
virtually every dimension (except gender) has contributed as well to stagnant median earnings. 9
The debates between those emphasizing labor market forces like skill-biased technical change
(SBTC), globalization, and declining growth of the college-educated population versus those
emphasizing weakening institutions like unions and federal minimum wages are well known at
this point (Groshen and Holzer 2019). Even those emphasizing changes in the demand for and
supply of college-educated workers in the market have noted the flattening of the ratio of college
to high school wages since 2000, while inequality has risen within the higher-skilled group and
especially between those with only bachelor’s degrees and those with graduate degrees (Autor,
Goldin, and Katz 2020).
Still, a few new developments in the empirical literature on rising earnings inequality are
noteworthy. For one thing, differences between firms account for more of the variance in
employee earnings over time than in the past (Barth et al. 2014). At the same time, the rising
capital intensity of “superstar” firms (Autor et al. 2017) and institutional developments might
also limit the ability of workers to share in firm-level product market success. Another

9

While gender differences are not a main focus of this paper, the decline in the gender earnings gap has
largely been driven by rising relative education and earnings among women, as well as declining discrimination and
product market shifts from manufacturing to services (Blau and Kahn 2016).
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possibility is that information problems prevent employers from tapping into skills developed on
the job by experienced noncollege workers (Blair et al. 2020).
Beyond declining unionism, Weil (2019) has called our attention to the growth in
“fissured” workplaces—i.e., those in which different occupational groups under the same roof
and at the same firm actually work for different employers. Although we have limited data on
this, such fissuring likely prevents many groups of workers from sharing in the product market
success of firms that sell the goods and services they produce. It also reduces firms’ incentives to
invest in educating or training their workers, to whom they now have little long-term
commitment. Accordingly, an increase in fissuring over time likely contributes to a widening
compensation gap between less-educated and more-educated workers (and between labor and
capital) over time as well.
Fissuring workplaces are part of a broader story of a likely shift from “high road” to “low
road” human resource strategies among many firms for their less-educated workers (Osterman
2017). Firms can sometimes choose to compete in high workers’ skills and performance
(accompanied by better compensation, more worker training, and/or profit sharing) rather than
low labor costs. Evidence suggests that in recent years, firms are less interested in the former
approach. Since high-road employers generate a public good for workers, their families, and their
communities, an argument can be made that they should receive some public support through
technical assistance or subsidies.
Strikingly, the common thread in all these explanations is that they are not likely to
subside or reverse in the near future without direct policy action. The business cycle might
speed or slow these forces, but it rarely changes the broad trends.
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In this context, how did the Great Recession and subsequent recovery affect earnings
among less-educated workers? While the employment of non‒college graduates appears more
cyclically sensitive than that of college grads (Hines et al. 2002), the evidence suggests that
wages of young college graduates might be hurt somewhat more than those of non‒college
graduates when they enter the labor market in serious recessions (Altonji, Kahn, and Speer
2014), with effects persisting for many years. This might be true at least partly because wage
growth among these graduates depends more on work experience, which recessions disrupt, as
well as the quality of employer-employee matches, which recessions impede as well.
But there is also evidence that the new technologies that limit the earnings of the working
class—thereby generating SBTC—are more frequently implemented during recessions
(Jaimovich and Siu 2012), since the disruption costs of implementing them are lowered when
business is down. Furthermore, we have clear evidence that firms raise worker education
requirements during recessions, since college graduates are relatively more available than at
other points in the business cycle; but the evidence also suggests that, as recovery from
recessions occurs, at least some of the higher skill requirements remain in place (Hershbein and
Kahn 2018).
As we noted earlier, earnings among disadvantaged workers rose a bit more in the past
five years than those of more-educated workers (see also Aaronson et al. 2019), but overall
earnings growth was not sufficient to offset decades of stagnation. Labor markets were also less
tight during the recovery than the unemployment rate suggested (Blanchflower 2019). The flow
of workers out of the labor force during the Great Recession, which we describe more fully
below, generated a larger pool of potential workers available to gradually reenter as the labor
market tightened, thereby reducing the pressure on employers to raise wages substantially.
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B.

Labor Force Participation, Earnings, and the Business Cycle
As we note above, labor force participation of women rose consistently during the second

half of the twentieth century, though it dipped after 2000. It also declined modestly during the
Great Recession, as we would expect, but only among college-educated females did it fully
rebound to its 2007 levels by 2019.
In contrast, participation by less-educated men declined consistently over the past four
decades, and notably during the Great Recession. It also failed to recover during the expansion.
These developments reflect both the greater cyclical sensitivity of male employment—as males
remain more heavily represented in cyclical industries like construction and manufacturing—and
perhaps more hysteresis (or long-term scarring) as well from their earlier employment declines.
What accounts for different participation trends between women and men? The rising
education and earnings potential of women compared to men no doubt has generated different
“labor supply” responses—rising for women and falling for men, as we would expect if their
labor supply elasticities (measuring effects of wages on willingness to work) are positive. 10
At the same time, it seems unlikely that relative wage opportunities, and movements up
and down their respective “labor supply” functions, explain all of these differences. For women,
decreasing marriage rates and rising single parenthood no doubt contributed to their greater need
to work, even at low wages. And changes in income support policies—including welfare reform
and the rise of the Earned Income Tax Credit in the 1980s and 1990s—raised incentives to work
for low-income women. International experience suggests that work among women would likely

10

Historically, full-time work among prime-age men was widely regarded as socially mandated. But the
withdrawal of so many noncollege prime-age men from the workforce in recent decades (Eberstadt 2016; Krueger
2017) as their earnings deteriorated clearly indicates increases over time in their labor supply elasticities, as
discretion about whether and how much to work among men has grown more acceptable.
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have continued to rise had the United States adopted more “family friendly” policies, such as
child care assistance and paid family leave (Black, Schanzenbach, and Breitwieser 2017).
Similarly, declining work among less-educated men cannot be fully explained by their
stagnant or declining wages (Binder and Bound 2019). For African American men, criminal
records and perhaps child support arrears reduce labor force participation (Eberstadt 2016;
Holzer, Offner, and Sorenson 2005).
More broadly, poor health and disability among less-educated men reduce work effort,
but only partly through dependence on disability insurance (Krueger 2017). Geographic
imbalances in labor market strength—exacerbated by declining manufacturing employment after
2000 (Autor, Dorn, and Hanson 2016) and the reduced geographic mobility of workers (Austin,
Glaeser, and Summers 2018)—further contribute to declining work among blue-collar workers
and especially working-class men in recent years.
Given these forces, it is not surprising that labor force participation among less-educated
workers (particularly for men) remained lower during the recovery from the Great Recession in
those geographic areas hit hardest by the downturn (Yagan 2018), as hysteresis suggests. The
deteriorating skills and networks that occur as a result of lengthy periods of nonwork, plus
diminishing employer interest (Krueger, Kramer, and Cho 2014), seem to hurt less-educated men
the most.

IV.

WHAT ABOUT THE PANDEMIC RECESSION OF 2020–2021?
The pandemic-induced recession of 2020 began with notable employment losses in

March, followed by extreme job losses in April. Then a recovery began in May—rapid at first,
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then slower. During the months of November and December, employment rates were completely
flat.
In Table 3 we present employment-to-population rates, adjusted for reported absences
from work (for reasons other than vacation, illness, weather, or labor disputes), in the aggregate
and then for subgroups by race, gender, and education. We present these rates for selected
months, beginning with the prerecession month of February, continuing through the trough in
April, and then for selected months until December 2020. 11
The results in Table 3 in the aggregate show the rapid decline, rapid partial recovery, and
then slowing recovery that occurred during the recession of 2020. Indeed, employment fell about
18 percentage points between February and April, then rose about 12 points between April and
December in the aggregate.
Table 3 also illustrates the extent to which workers of color and those with high school or
less education bore the brunt of the recession. Employment fell most rapidly for Hispanics and
also among blacks until April, and by the end of the year employment for each group remained
about eight points lower than in February. High school graduates experienced the largest initial
declines, while those with postgraduate education experienced the least; these patterns of relative
employment decline still held as of December.
Indeed, this recession has hit the least-educated harder than earlier ones, and their
recoveries have been slower since the sectors hardest hit have been leisure/hospitality and
personal services, where such workers are concentrated. And the fact that highly educated

These rates are drawn from computations using CPS-ORG data in Hershbein and Holzer (2021). Besides
the adjustment in the outcome variable, these tabulations are also based on a broader age sample—18–64—than we
used in earlier figures and in Tables 1 and 2. For additional analysis of COVID-19 labor market impacts through
September 2020 by demographic group, see Groshen (2020).
11
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workers can much more easily telecommute than those less educated has exacerbated
employment gaps during the recovery.
At the time of this writing, we do not yet know what the labor market recovery will look
like in 2021 and beyond, or the extent to which long-term unemployment and permanent job loss
will occur. But to date, less-educated workers and those of color have endured the highest rates
of permanent job loss (Hershbein and Holzer 2021).
The pandemic has likely accelerated the long-run shift toward online shopping in retail
trade and ordering food in leisure and hospitality, as well as the role of telecommuting (which
will hurt the service industries that cater to workers in downtown business districts). If so, lesseducated workers and those of color will continue to sustain disproportionately high permanent
job losses in 2021 and beyond. In other words, skill-biased technical changes associated with this
recession and eventual recovery will likely add to the plight of our lowest-wage workers.

V.

CONCLUSION
Three disappointing labor market trends over the past 40 years are widely known: 1)

median real wages have been fairly stagnant, 2) inequality between workers with and without
college degrees has dramatically increased, and 3) many less-educated prime-age men have left
the labor force. At the same time, gender inequality in both earnings and labor force activity has
declined.
The Great Recession affected earnings and labor force trends in a number of ways. The
recession itself speeded skill-biased technical changes that raised employer skill demands and
relative rewards for those with college degrees. The lengthy recovery afterward helped raise
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earnings, even a bit more among low-wage workers than others. Wage gains for Asians and
Hispanics have also exceeded those for whites and blacks.
Yet, these recent developments did not broadly disrupt trends in earnings inequality
between college and noncollege workers, nor did they alter the fact that median real wages for
the less-educated have been fairly stagnant (among women) and declining (for men) over most of
the past four decades.
Labor force activity has also followed very different patterns by gender and education.
Between 1979 and 2000, participation rates rose strongly for women with and without college
degrees, while they fell for less-educated men. After 2000, they fell for both less-educated men
and women, and they modestly declined during the Great Recession. Even during the recovery
from the recession, we see few signs of rebounding labor force participation among lesseducated workers, and significant increases only among educated women.
In particular, the longer-term negative trends among less-educated men likely reflect
hysteresis effects. That is, workers may have difficulty recovering from lengthy periods with no
work activity, because of depreciating skills, diminishing employer interest, and loss of labor
market information and contacts with other workers. And while not as cyclical, the recent lack of
labor-force growth among women is troubling; it likely indicates a need for better policies to
balance work and family life, such as subsidized child care and paid family leave.
Then too, the pandemic-induced recession of 2020 generated large employment losses,
especially for less-educated workers and those of color. It is too early yet to infer long-term
employment losses from the recession, or any effects on wages, though our evidence to date on
the former implies that the recession will exacerbate existing inequalities over time.
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What does the future hold? Automation and globalization in the coming decades will no
doubt continue to challenge the employment circumstances of workers—those both with and
without college degrees. Many may suffer displacement or declining wages, along with labor
market withdrawal.
What policies might help us reverse the disappointing 40-year trends in labor market
outcomes for the working class, as well as the more recent and very unequal effects of the
pandemic-induced recession? Since both market forces (including market failures) and
institutions have contributed to these outcomes, a wide variety of policy responses might be
needed to combat them.
Such policies could include the following:
•

Strengthening our public higher education (especially community colleges) and
workforce systems to improve workers’ abilities to adapt to labor market shocks by
retraining.

•

Strengthening the institutions that support worker compensation for those without
college degrees, like collective bargaining (or other forms of worker “voice”) and
minimum wages.

•

Rewards for “high-road” or higher-wage employers who invest in their workers and
share their profits with them, perhaps through the tax system (Holzer 2019).

•

Additional ways to “make work pay” for lower-wage workers—such as the EITC, as
well as better paid family leave and subsidized high-quality child care.

•

Policies to enhance competition in product and labor markets, and to limit employer
restrictions on worker options and information.

•

Special efforts to reduce barriers to work among those with health problems and
disabilities and/or criminal records.

•

Improving our official labor market statistics, which is critical for managing policy
and helping employers and workers make the best decisions possible to thrive in a
changing economy.
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Figure 1 Annual Employment-Population Ratios for Individuals Ages 25–54, 1979–2019
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SOURCE: Authors’ calculations from the Current Population Survey’s basic monthly files.

Figure 2 Annual Labor Force Participation Rates for Ages 25–54, 1979–2019
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Figure 3 Annual Median Real Hourly Wages for Ages 25-54, 1979‒2019 (2019 dollars)
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NOTE:Wages are adjusted for inflation (here and in all data presented below) using the chain-weighted GDP
deflator for personal consumption expenditures.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations from Current Population Survey’s Outgoing Rotation Groups.

Figure 4 Median Real Hourly Wages among Employed Individuals with a High School
Diploma or Less Education, Ages 25–54, by Gender
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NOTE: Wages are adjusted for inflation (here and in all data presented below) using the chain-weighted GDP
deflator for personal consumption expenditures.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations from Current Population Survey’s Outgoing Rotation Groups.
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Figure 5 Median Real Hourly Wages among Employed Individuals with a Bachelor’s
Degree or More Education, Ages 25–54, by Gender
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NOTE: Wages are adjusted for inflation (here and in all data presented below) using the chain-weighted GDP
deflator for personal consumption expenditures.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations from Current Population Survey’s Outgoing Rotation Groups.

Figure 6 Labor Force Participation among Individuals with a High School Diploma or
Less Education, Ages 25–54, by Gender
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Figure 7 Labor Force Participation among Individuals with a Bachelor’s Degree or More
Education, Ages 25–54, by Gender
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SOURCE: Authors’ calculations from the Current Population Survey’s basic monthly files.

Figure 8 Percent Changes in Labor Force Participation (LFP) and Median Real Hourly
Wages, by Gender and Education, Ages 25–54, 2007–2019
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SOURCE: Authors’ calculations from the Current Population Survey’s basic monthly files.
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Female BA+

Figure 9 Percent Changes in Labor Force Participation (LFP) and Median Real Wages by
Race and Gender, Ages 25–54, 2007–2019
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NOTE: Wages are adjusted for inflation (here and in all data presented below) using the chain-weighted GDP
deflator for personal consumption expenditures.
SOURCE: Labor force participation—authors’ calculations, derived from the Current Population Survey’s basic
monthly files. Median real wages—authors’ calculations, derived from Current Population Survey’s Outgoing
Rotation Groups.
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Table 1 Real Median Hourly Wages for Employed Individuals, Ages 25‒54, by Race and
Ethnicity (2019 dollars)
1979

2000

2007

2010

2019

Non-Hispanic White
Males
Females

18.43
22.12
13.59

20.36
23.62
17.55

21.62
24.03
18.80

21.81
24.10
19.31

23.08
25.00
21.00

African American
Males
Females

14.75
17.69
12.50

15.66
16.85
15.09

16.22
17.28
15.62

16.64
17.22
16.07

17.31
18.00
16.83

Hispanic or Latino
Males
Females

14.04
14.74
12.64

14.88
15.62
13.82

14.92
15.78
13.77

17.00
18.00
15.45

Asian
Males
Females

21.06
23.63
18.25

23.10
25.99
20.42

22.96
25.16
20.66

28.00
30.05
24.04

NOTE: Table 1 shows labor force participation rates for five different racial and ethnic groups. Blank = not
available. Prior to 2003, “Asian” and “Pacific Islander” were not separate racial categories. If a respondent
recorded multiple races, that person was assigned to the smallest individual group of those listed by the
respondent. (This only applies to a very small number of individuals in 2013 and beyond.)
SOURCE: The CPS ORG extracts provided by the Center for Economic Policy Research.
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Table 2 Labor Force Participation Rates, Ages 25‒54, by Race and Ethnicity, 1979–2019
1979

2000

2007

2010

2019

Non-Hispanic White
Males
Females

78.5
95.3
62.4

85.6
92.9
78.5

84.5
91.7
77.4

83.6
90.1
77.3

84.4
90.1
78.7

African American
Males
Females

77.0
89.0
67.4

81.5
84.6
78.9

80.0
83.4
77.2

79.0
82.1
76.3

80.8
83.2
78.8

Hispanic or Latino
Males
Females

80.4
92.4
67.8

80.7
92.6
67.3

80.4
91.3
68.1

80.4
90.5
69.9

Asian
Males
Females

81.0
91.8
71.4

80.7
91.0
71.4

80.2
89.2
71.9

80.3
90.1
71.5

77.7
83.4
69.7

75.9
80.0
72.4

76.9
82.5
72.0

American Indian or Pacific Islander
Males
Females

NOTE: Blank = not available. Prior to 2003, “Asian” and “Pacific Islander” were not separate racial categories. If
a respondent recorded multiple races, that respondent was assigned to the smallest individual group of those listed
by the respondent. (This only applies to a very small number of individuals in 2013 and beyond.)
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations from the Current Population Survey’s basic monthly files.
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Table 3 Adjusted Employment-Population Ratios by Race, Gender, and Education
during 2020
Feb.

April

June

Oct.

Dec.

All individuals

73.9%

55.8%

63.1%

68.1%

68.1%

Non-Hispanic White
African American
Hispanic or Latino

75.6%
69.8%
72.6%

59.2%
51.5%
49.9%

66.7%
57.1%
58.2%

71.0%
62.6%
65.0%

71.0%
62.3%
64.2%

Men
Women

79.1%
68.9%

61.0%
50.8%

67.9%
58.5%

73.2%
63.2%

72.6%
63.7%

Less than high school
High school/some college
Associate degree
Bachelor’s degree
Graduate degree

55.1%
68.7%
78.1%
82.3%
86.5%

36.3%
47.4%
59.7%
67.0%
75.0%

43.3%
56.2%
67.8%
71.7%
80.6%

50.1%
62.4%
72.0%
76.5%
83.4%

49.6%
61.9%
71.3%
77.1%
83.8%

NOTE: Table 3 is drawn from Hershbein and Holzer (2021). Workers aged 16 to 64 are included. Those who
were missing from work in the reference week for reasons other than illness, weather, vacation, or labor disputes
are counted as not employed.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations from the Current Population Survey’s basic monthly files.
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